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THE SHIFTING TERRAIN OF RISK AND 
UNCERTAINTY ON THE LIABILITY 
INSURANCE FIELD 
Tom Baker* 
[A] high degree of scientific and technical uncertainty permeates 
the insurance industry, the very business that is charged with trans­
forming uncertainty into risk .... Scrutiny of how insurers face their 
own incapacities reveals that theirs is an uncertain business, and 
that we live not so much in a risk society as in an uncertain society.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Concepts can impede understanding, sometimes by persuading us 
that we understand something that we really do not; other times they 
impede understanding by diverting our attention from what we would 
readily recognize that we do not understand, if only we thought long 
enough about it. The conceptual link between insurance and risk­
with risk understood here as the calculable subset within a larger set 
of uncertainties-may be one such impediment.2 lf insurance and risk 
are tightly linked, and if risk is ca/wlable, then we may think that we 
can understand the insurance business as a kind of applied 
econometric enterprise. 
Work in Jaw and political science has challenged the idea that insur­
ance underwriting and pricing should be based on purely statistical 
considerations.3 Yet even this work has tended to take as given the 
links between insurance and risk and between risk and calculability. 
Risk classification undoubtedly is " (t]oo ( i ]mportant to be [! ]eft to the 
• William Maul Measey Professor of Law. University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thank 
you to Jay Feinman and Scan Fitzpatrick for helpful comments. 
I. RICHARD V. ERICSON & AARON DoYLE. UNCERT,\IN f311SINESS: RISK. INSURANCE. ,\ND 
II IE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 5 (200-1). 
2. See Franf1ois Ewald. Insurance ami Uisk. in Tur- Fouc,\IJLI EFnc-r: S 1 \!DIES IN GovFRN­
MFNTALITY 197,201-02 (Graham Burchell ct al. cds .. 1991). 
3. See Regina Austin. The Insurance Classification Contml'ersy. 131 U. PA. L. REv. 517 
(19R3): Brian J. Glenn. The Shifting Rhetoric uf lnsurm1ce Denial. :14 LAw & Soc'v REv. 779 
(2000); Deborah S. Hellman. Is Acwarially l·i1ir lusumnce l)ricing Actually Fair'!.· A Case Study 
in Insuring !Jauered IV omen. 32 I-IARV. C.R.-C. L. L. RFv. 355 ( 1997): Jonathan Simon. Fhe Ideo­
logical Effects of Actuarial Practices. 22 LAW & Soc'v Rr-v. 771 (19RR). 
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[a ]ctuaries,"4 but the substitutes offered are other concepts-equal 
protection, privacy, and solidarity-that would trump the (imagined} 
purely statistical analysis only in limited circumstances. Left uninves­
tigated and therefore not understood by these challenges is the pro­
cess through which insurance institutions actually transform (or do not 
transform) uncertainty into risk. 
Recent sociological and historical work-most prominently that of 
Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle, on the one hand, and Timothy Al­
born on the other-has helped to remind us that insurance risks very 
often are not reliably calculable except in hindsight, at which point the 
risk has already been transformed into an all-too-measurable loss.5 
Insurance is an "uncertain business," characterized by competition for 
premiums that pushes insurers into the unknown.6 Even life insur­
ance, the part of the business that manages the oldest and best-under­
stood insurance risk-mortality-operates just beyond the limits of 
knowledge.7 For a recent example, consider the life-settlements mar­
ket through which hedge funds purchase and hold bundles of life in­
surance in a strategy to exploit and systematically frustrate life 
insurers' actuarial assumptions.8 
This Article takes some preliminary steps in the direction of ex­
tending the insights of this sociological and historical work to the lia­
bility insurance field. Part II begins with a simple quantitative 
comparison of U.S. property and liability insurance premiums over 
the last sixty years, setting the stage to make four points.9 First, liabil­
ity insurance premiums have grown about as much as property insur­
ance premiums over this period, 10 providing yet another piece of 
evidence supporting the view that the growth in U.S. liability costs 
represents an ordinary consequence of a growing economy rather than 
an unusual or pernicious feature of U.S. culture.11 Second, there are 
systematic variations in the rate of growth in insurance premiums over 
4. Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to Be Left to the Actuaries, 19 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 349 ( 1986). 
5. See generally TIMOTHY ALBORN, REGULATED LivEs: LIFE INSURANCE AND BRITISH Soci­
ETY, 1800-1914 (2009): ERICSON & DoYLE, supra note 1. See also GEoFFREY CLARK, BETTING 
ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE INSURANCE IN ENGLAND, 1695-1775 (1999); PAT O'MALLEY, 
RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND GoVERNMENT (2004). 
6. See ERICSON & DoYLE, supra note 1, at 47. 
7. See hi.; see also ALBORN, supra note 5, at lJ-11, 102-35. 
8. See Jenny Anderson, New Exotic Investments Emerging on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 
2009, at At. 
9. See infra notes 15-22. 
10. See infra notes 17-19. 
11. See generally WILl.IAM HAL TOM & MICHAEL McCANN, DISTORTING THE LAw: PoLITICS, 
MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004). 
2011] THE SHIFTING TERRAIN OF RISK 523 
time corresponding to what is known in the insurance industry as the 
underwriting cycle.12 The cycle is more pronounced in liability insur­
ance than in property insurance, perhaps accounting for the greater 
popular attention to the uncertainties of liability risks as compared to 
property risks. Third, the greater variation in liability insurance pre­
miums is almost entirely attributable to the smaller, non-statutorily 
required lines of insurance: most significantly the various lines of com­
mercial liability insurance. Auto liability and workers' compensation 
premiums, by contrast, largely vary in tandem with property insurance 
premiums. Finally, because media coverage of liability and liability in­
surance increases during the insurance "crisis" stage of the underwrit­
ing cycle-when premiums increase sharply-the widely held beliefs 
in myths about litigation may result, at least in part, from generaliza­
tions drawn from a systematically biased set of observations, analo­
gous to the media bias toward big, unusual cases documented by 
William Haltom and Michael McCann.13 
Part III moves in a more qualitative, speculative direction by con­
sidering liability insurance as a "business that is charged with trans­
forming uncertainty into risk."14 It discusses how one might explore 
more systematically in the liability and insurance context the signifi­
cance of Ericson and Doyle's remarkable conclusion that uncertainty­
reducing innovations shift the limits of insurers' knowledge but do not 
shift insurers' need to operate just beyond those limits. It explores 
some of the changing terrain of risk and uncertainty on the liability 
insurance field, closing with the admittedly speculative conclusion that 
the insurance underwriting cycle might be both a cause and a conse­
quence of liability insurers' efforts to push the liability and insurability 
frontier. 
II. COMPARING LIABILITY AND PROPERTY INSURANCE 
PREMIUMS OVER TIME 
In setting out to compile the aggregate data that would form the 
empirical backdrop for this Article, I assumed two things that turned 
out to be wrong. First, I assumed that compiling the data would be 
easy, because the same statistical service (Best's) has continuously 
tracked the property casualty insurance industry for over one hundred 
12. See Sean M. Fitzpatrick, Fear Is the Key: A Behavioral Guide to Underwriting Cycles, 10 
CoNN. INs. L.J. 255. 256 (2003). 
13. See HALTOM & McCANN, supra note 11. at 156-59. 
14. ERicsoN & DoYLE. supra note l. at 5; see also infra notes 23-53. 
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years.t5 Second, and more interestingly, I assumed that liability insur­
ance premiums would show much more significant growth than prop­
erty premiums, particularly in the latter third of the twentieth century. 
Like other empirically minded torts teachers, I have followed the 
tort reform debates closely and, although I have disagreed with the 
defendants' lobby about the interpretation of the data, 16 I knew that 
aggregate liability insurance premiums in the U.S. had grown substan­
tially in real terms over the twentieth century. I had always assumed 
that this growth significantly outpaced growth in property insurance 
premiums. Otherwise, why were insurance industry sources so out­
spoken about rising liability insurance premiums? In most cases, the 
same insurance groups write liability and property insurance, and I 
assumed (wrongly, it turns out) that their comparative silence about 
property insurance premiums meant that those premiums were not 
increasing as much. 
Below, Figure 1 shows that I was wrong about the relationship be­
tween property and liability insurance while also showing that, despite 
some difficulty, it is possible to compile the data.t7 Figure 1 plots the 
aggregate liability and property insurance premiums from 1939 to 
2008 in constant 2008 dollars for the total U.S. insurance industry, as 
reported by Best's based on data from the annual reports required to 
be filed with state insurance departments in the United States (and 
converted to 2008 dollars using the consumer price index table from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics).18 The solid line represents total liabil­
ity insurance premiums; the dashed line represents total property in­
surance premiums; and the dotted line represents the difference 
between the two. 
15. See Best's, Aggregates and Averages: Property Casualty Edition and predecessor 
publications. 
16. See, e.g., ToM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005); Tom Baker, Herbert 
Kritzer & Neil Vidmar, Jackpot Justice and the American Tort System: Thinking Beyond Junk 
Science ( William Mitchell College of Law, Research Paper No. 95, 2008), available at http:// 
ssm.com/abstract= 1152306. 
17. The difficulty comes from the fact that the data categories have changed several times 
during the 1939 to 2008 period, reflecting changes in the categories in which insurance regulators 
have required insurance companies to report their premiums and in which Best's has aggregated 
that data in its annual publication. 
18. See Best's, supra note 15. U.S. DEI''T oF LABoR: CoNsUMER PRICE INDEX, ftp://ftp.bls. 
gov/pub/special.requestslcpilcpiai.txt (last visited Mar. 31, 2011) (updated monthly). These ag­
gregate premiums likely understate the growth in property and liability losses in the large com­
mercial sector of the U.S. economy, as large corporations have increasingly retained the most 
predictable and most costly primary layer of exposure, but I am aware of no reason that this 
trend would have a differential effect on property and liability insurance premiums. 
T 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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FIGURE 1 
NET PREMIUMS WRITIEN, u.s. P&C INDUSTRY 1939-2008 
300,000,000 .----------------------------,
250,000,000 +------ -- Liability 
200,000,000 +------
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...... • Difference 
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-50,000,000 ...1---------------------------l 
From 1958-the year when total liability premiums first equaled total 
property insurance premiums-to 2008, property insurance premiums 
have grown at a real average annual rate of 3.21 o/o and liability insur­
ance premiums have grown at a real annual average rate of 3.67o/o. 
Over that period, property insurance premiums have grown a total of 
368o/o and liability insurance premiums have grown a total of 436°/o in 
constant 2008 dollars. Over that same period, GOP grew 414o/o in real 
terms, indicating that the property insurance premium growth slightly 
lagged that of the economy generally and liability insurance slightly 
outpaced that growth, but the orders of magnitude are very similar.19 
As the dotted line in Figure 1 reflects, liability insurance premiums 
have grown at a more variable rate than property insurance premi­
ums. From 1958 to 2008, aggregate liability insurance premiums aver­
aged 124 o/o of aggregate property insurance premiums, but there was 
an eleven-year period-from 1986 to 1997-in which the liability in­
surance premiums were 145o/o of the property insurance premiums.20 
The difference between the premiums in the two categories of insur­
ance is greatest following the three most significant "hard market" 
phases of the underwriting cycle that occurred during this period: 
19. Author's calculation uses the U.S. Dm•'T oF CoMMERCE BuREAU oF EcoN. ANALYSIS, 
GOP TABLES, available at http://www.bea.gov/nationaVnipaweb/SclcctTable.asp?Popular= Y 
(use Table 1.1.6), and CoNsUMER PRICE INDEX, supra note 18. Liability insurance premium 
growth substantially outpaced property insurance premium growth in the early years shown in 
Figure 1. From 1939 to 1958, property insurance premiums grew 151 o/o in real terms while liabil­
ity insurance premiums grew 265% in real terms. 
20. All calculations are based on Best's data and Consumer Price Index data used as source 
for Figure 1. 
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1976-1977, 1985-1986, and 2002-2003.21 Much of the difference is at­
tributable to rapid growth in liability insurance premiums during just 
two years: 1985 and 1986 (a 56% increase in liability insurance premi­
ums over those two years compared to 28 o/o increase in property in­
surance premiums). The rest is attributable to differences in growth 
during 1975-1976 (34% for liability and 26o/o for property) and 
2002-2003 (27o/o for liability and 20°/o for property), and to quicker 
declines in growth in property insurance premiums following each of 
the three hard market periods. 
This difference in the variability of premium growth rates helps ex­
plain the popular perception that liability insurance has grown more 
rapidly than property insurance. During hard market periods, liability 
insurance premiums in fact do grow more rapidly than property insur­
ance premiums. These are also the periods in which articles about the 
problems in liability appear most widely in the media.22 Thus, al­
though liability and property insurance premiums may be growing at 
roughly the same rate on average, liability insurance premiums grow 
more rapidly when people are most likely to pay attention, leading to 
the facially plausible, but in fact incorrect belief that liability insurance 
premiums-and therefore the underlying liabilities-generally grow 
at a rate significantly exceeding the growth in GDP. In other words, 
the perception that liability and liability insurance premiums have 
grown disproportionately in relation to the underlying economy rep­
resents a generalization from a biased set of observations. 
Below, Figure 2 presents a breakdown of the liability insurance pre­
miums over time by category of insurance. Figure 2 reflects a reality 
that is often forgotten: at the aggregate level, the liability insurance 
market is dominated by the legally mandated forms of liability insur­
ance-auto liability and workers' compensation. Automobile liability 
insurance premiums account for more than half of the total in all but a 
few years during this period. Only in very recent years have all of the 
other kinds of liability insurance put together equaled the workers' 
compensation share of liability insurance premiums. Moreover, the 
slight decline in the share of workers' compensation insurance premi­
ums reflects slower growth in workers' compensation insurance pre­
miums rather than particularly rapid growth in the other non-auto 
2 1. See Scott E. Harrington, Tort Liability, Insurance Rates, and the Insurance Cycle, in 
BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAI'ERS ON fiNANCIAL SERVICES 97, 97 ( Robert E. Litan & Richard 
Herring eds., 2004). 
22. See Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Undenvriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L. 
REv. 393, 431-33 (2005) (reporting results of content analysis of news files relating to medical 
malpractice). Cf. HALTOM & McCANN, supra note 11, at 147-82 (discussing the importance of 
the media to perceptions about tort law). 
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lines of liability insurance. Despite all the attention to medical mal­
practice and products liability in the media and the academic litera­
ture, medical malpractice insurance premiums represent a tiny 
fraction of the total; and the products liability insurance premium line 
is barely visible at the bottom of the chart. 
FIGURE 2 
LIABILITY INSURANCE NET PREMIUMS WRITTEN, 1939-2008 
2008 DOLLARS (IN THOUSANDS) 
300,000,000.......--------------------------,
250,000,000 --Total liability 
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200,000,000 
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150,000,000 - · ·- I·IISC./Other 
------- l·ledlcal 1-Jalpractlce 
100,000,000 
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0��������������������--��� 
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Thinking about Figures 1 and 2 together raises a question about 
what portions of the liability insurance market are driving the differ­
ence in the variability of the liability and property premiums over 
time. Figure 1 shows that liability insurance premiums are more varia­
ble than property insurance premiums. Figure 2 suggests that the lines 
of insurance that are not the legally mandated forms of liability insur­
ance have grown more significantly than those traditional lines (auto 
and workers' compensation), but Figure 2 does not allow for easy 
comparisons in the rates of growth. Figure 3, below, does just that. 
Figure 3 shows the annual real growth in property insurance premi­
ums (the dotted line), the statutorily mandated liability insurance lines 
of auto and workers' compensation (the dashed line), and all of the 
other lines of liability insurance (the solid line). As Figure 3 shows, 
the growth in automobile and workers' compensation lines has closely 
tracked that of property insurance since the 1950s. The big difference 
lies in the other lines of liability insurance, suggesting that there are 
greater year-to-year uncertainties in those other lines of liability insur­
ance than in either automobile liability or workers' compensation 
insurance. 
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FIGURE 3 
ANNUAL CHANGE IN REAL AGGREGATE PREMIUMS, 1939-2008 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
- - Auto+ Comp 
--Other Liability 
••••••• Property 
III. TRANSFORMING UNCERTAINTY INTO RISK? 
Summarizing the discussion thus far, what we see is that aggregate 
U.S. property and liability insurance premiums have grown at roughly 
the same rate, on average, since the middle of the twentieth century, 
but the growth in liability insurance premiums varies over time more 
significantly than the growth in property insurance premiums. The 
long term total growth in liability insurance premiums is largely attrib­
utable to automobile liability insurance, with the premiums for all 
non-auto liability insurance exceeding the premiums for workers' 
compensation insurance only in the last ten years; this is apparently a 
result of decline in the growth of workers' compensation insurance 
rather than a significant increase in the growth of these other kinds of 
insurance. Finally, developments in those other kinds of liability in­
surance account for most of the greater variation in liability insurance 
premiums as compared to property insurance. 
If Ericson and Doyle's generalizations about risk and uncertainty 
hold true in the liability insurance market, then these already variable 
aggregate results should be masking even more turmoil in the opera­
tion of the liability insurance business. There are good reasons to be­
lieve that Ericson and Doyle's generalizations do hold true in this 
context. Ericson and Doyle investigated three sectors of the insurance 
industry: life insurance, disability insurance, and property insurance.23 
Notwithstanding the significant differences among these sectors-dif-
23. See generally ERicsoN & DoYLE, supra note 1. 
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ferent kinds of insured risks and different approaches to managing 
those risks-the researchers found a common pattern of competition 
pushing organizations just beyond the limits of knowledge.24 To be­
lieve that this pattern would not hold in the liability insurance context, 
we would need to have some reason to conclude that liability insur­
ance risks are more calculable than life, disability, or property insur­
ance risks. 
Yet there are good reasons to believe that liability insurance risks 
may be less calculable than these other risks. The forms of insurance 
that Ericson and Doyle investigated are loss-based, meaning that they 
provide financial protection for the designated harm (death, disability, 
or property damage) without regard to how the harm took place. 
Pricing these kinds of insurance requires estimating the rate and cost 
of the insured harms. By contrast, liability insurance provides finan­
cial protection only when the harm can be attributed to a liability­
creating act such as the breach of the standard of reasonable care or­
in the workers' compensation context-an injury arising out of work. 
This means that the uncertainties of liability insurance include not 
only developments in the rate and cost of insured harms but also de­
velopments in the standard of care and other aspects of liability.25 
Uncertainties about these latter developments add an additional layer 
of uncertainty to the uncertainties about the underlying injuries and 
damage. The greater variation between property and liability insur­
ance premiums at the aggregate level, as described in Part II, provides 
some support for this conclusion. 
Nevertheless, even if liability-related risks are only as uncertain as 
those addressed by disability, life, and property insurance, that would 
leave more than enough room for the dynamic that Ericson and Doyle 
described: namely, that uncertainty-reducing innovations shift the lim­
its of knowledge but not insurers' need to operate just beyond those 
limits. In the remainder of this Part, I will offer some admittedly im­
pressionistic suggestions of some of the ways that this dynamic plays 
out in the liability insurance context. 
A. Transforming Uncertainty into Risk 
Based on observation and study of the liability insurance market, 
my sense is that three key developments have improved liability insur­
ers' ability to predict liability risks. This sense represents informed 
24. See id. at 22-23. 
25. See Tom Baker, Insuring Liability Risks, 29 GENEVA PAPERs <>N RtsK AND INs. 12H, 
130-31 (2004). 
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intuition, without systematic empirical support. Thus, the following 
should be regarded as hypotheses, not proof: {1) advances in data 
gathering and analysis have led to a quantitative revolution in the 
tracking and valuation of routine claims, especially in the automobile 
liability context, resulting in more accurate forecasts of both the fre­
quency and severity of insured liability losses; (2) because the liability 
insurance policy limits purchased by individuals have not kept pace 
with inflation, once again especially for automobile liability, an in­
creasing percentage of claims are capped at the policy limit, in effect 
truncating the right tail of the severity distribution (i.e., the high se­
verity claims that happen less frequently); and (3) insurers have 
shifted an increasing proportion of their professional and commercial 
liability risks into a kind of insurance contract that poses less of the 
difficult-to-evaluate "long tail" liability risk than the contracts of the 
past. The paragraphs that follow describe each of these hypotheses in 
turn. 
1. The Quant Revolution 
Although still very much a work in progress, the quant revolution 
has significantly changed the valuation of routine accident claims, es­
pecially in the automobile liability context. The automobile insurance 
adjusters from the 1960s, as profiled in H. Lawrence Ross's Settled 
Out of Court, used their intuition and experience to craft settlement 
offers.26 Today, automobile insurance adjusters use claims-valuation 
software that takes the injury and demographic information and pro­
duces a range of permissible settlement offers. To my knowledge, 
there are no publications reporting the results of horse races between 
the quantitative models and experienced adjusters, but my informed 
impression is that the automobile insurance industry has completely 
shifted to data-driven adjusting for routine claims and relies heavily 
on claims-valuation software even when adjusting serious, non-routine 
claims. This shift strongly supports the view-expressed forcefully in 
Ian Ayres' Super Crunchers-that "intuition and experience are 
evolving to interact with data-based decision making. "27 
The insurance industry has long had massive amounts of data. 
Since the 1990s, the industry has been working on making that data 
accessible for (proprietary) analysis, for example by putting under­
writing and claims data on the same platform, with the result that the 
26. See generally H. LAURENCE Ross, SETILED ouT oF CouRT: THE SociAL PRocEss OF 
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT (1980). 
27. IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING-BY-NUMBERS Is THE NEW WAY TO BE 
SMART 16-17 (2007). 
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"truly massive" datasets that Ian Ayres describes are now available 
within all of the major automobile insurance companies.28 Other lines 
of insurance may have lagged behind,29 but the clear trend in the lia­
bility insurance industry is to extend the quant revolution into other 
lines and into more severe claims. This trend points toward the reali­
zation of the "actuarial" approach to liability insurance that many 
lawyers and law professors probably thought was already more fully 
embodied in insurance practice than was actually the case. 30 
2. The Increasingly Binding Nature of Liability Limits 
Absent the poor claims-handling that leads to liability for "bad 
faith," an insurance company's liability for any given claim is capped 
at the dollar limit of the applicable insurance policy.31 No matter how 
serious the injury or how wrongful the defendant's conduct, the liabil­
ity insurance policy limit is the most that a liability insurance company 
is contractually obligated to pay as long as the claim is handled prop­
erly. Because plaintiffs almost never collect "real money" from Hreal 
people," even a claim that involves damages that significantly exceed 
the liability insurance policy limit will ordinarily be settled for no 
more than the available insurance amount.32 Indeed, the more that 
the value of the case exceeds the policy limit, the more quickly that 
the case will be settled for that policy limit because of the well-estab­
lished insurance law "duty to settle. "33 This dynamic is well estab­
lished and well appreciated by informed observers of the liability and 
insurance universe. 34 
28. Author's personal knowledge based on use of confidential, proprietary insurance company 
data as reported in Albert Yoon & Tom Baker, Offer-of-Judgment Rules and Civil Litigation: An 
Empirical Study of Automobile Insurance Litigation in the East, 59 VAND. L. REv. 155 (2006). 
29. See, e.g., Charles Silver & Kathryn Zeiler, Presentation to Law and Society Association: 
Medical Malpractice Reserving Practices (2009) (powerpoint slides on file with author) (report­
ing surprising and persistent inaccuracies in medical malpractice insurance reserving revealed in 
the Texas Insurance Department Closed Claim database). 
30. Cf. Simon, supra note 3, at 786 (describing the critique of actuarial practices in which the 
individual is "the sum of the many roles he plays as a result of being a member of many status 
groups"). 
31. See generally Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REv. 11 13 ( 1990). 
32. Tom Baker, Bloocl Money, New Money, cmd the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 
LAw & Soc'y REv. 275, 276 (2001 ) . 
33. Syverud, supra note 31, at 1116. 
34. See generally Baker, supra note 32, at 275. See also Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & 
Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1055 (2006) (explaining this dy­
namic in the securities class action and directors' and officers' liability insurance contexts): 
Kathryn Zeiler et al., Physicians' Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from 
Texas Closed Claims, 1990-2003, 36 J. LEGAL STuD. S9 (2007). 
I·,�� ...  
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Less well appreciated, however, is the aggregate consequence when 
liability insurance premiums fail to keep up with inflation. As Ken­
neth Abraham explained in The Liability Century, the mandatory 
minimum automobile insurance policy limits have significantly lagged 
behind inflation, with the result that tort damages as determined by 
the law on the books are increasingly likely to exceed the available 
automobile insurance.35 Because the insurance companies' obligation 
to pay is capped at the policy limit, and because "blood money" is so 
rarely paid, this trend means that the damages awarded by tort law in 
action increasingly are simply the liability limit of the defendants' au­
tomobile liability insurance policy, sometimes supplemented by the 
plaintiffs' underinsured motorist coverage. Research using the Texas 
Department of Insurance medical malpractice claims database sug­
gests that the same phenomenon may be occurring with respect to 
medical malpractice claims, though with less impact on liability insur­
ance overall because of the relatively small size of the medical liability 
insurance market. 36 
3. The Changing Nature of Liability Insurance Contracts 
The two developments just discussed are most significant for auto­
mobile liability insurance. This third development affects commercial 
liability. Beginning with medical malpractice insurance in the 1970s, 
the liability insurance industry has gradually been shifting its "long 
tail" business (i.e., liability risks in which there is a long lag between 
the wrongful conduct and the eventual lawsuit) into liability insurance 
contracts that provide coverage on a claims-made basis. 
Traditionally, liability insurance provided coverage on an accident 
basis, meaning that the policy covered accidents that took place dur­
ing the policy period.37 This is still the case for automobile liability 
insurance. In the 1960s, the insurance industry shifted toward provid­
ing coverage on an occurrence basis, which extended the original con­
cept of accident to incorporate events that took place gradually, 
potentially over a long period of time.38 This approach led to massive 
exposures for asbestos and environmental injuries in the commercial 
context, and also for birth- and childhood-related conditions in the 
medical malpractice context. 
35. See KENNETt! S. ABI{AIIAM, THE LIABILITY CENTlii{Y; INSURANCE AND ToRT LAW FROM 
TilE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/1), at 10 1 (2008). 
36. See Zeiler ct at., supra note 34. at S9. 
37. See ToM BAKER. INSliRANC:E LAw AND Poucv 355 (2d ed. 2008). 
38. See id. 
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In response, the insurance industry shifted in the 1970s and 1980s to 
providing coverage on a claims-made basis in professional liability in­
surance and somewhat later-more gradually, and less completely-in 
the product and environmental liability context.39 A claims-made pol­
icy provides coverage for claims that are first made during the policy 
period.40 The claims-made form of coverage provides greater predict­
ability to insurers for two reasons. First, the policy is more likely to be 
sold close in time to when the claim is paid, thereby allowing the in­
surer to incorporate more recent information about the frequency and 
severity of claims into the price for the coverage. Second, because a 
claim can be first made only once, there is less likelihood that policies 
from multiple years will be triggered by a claim or a set of related 
claims (such as a mass tort), thereby capping the insurer's exposure at 
the limit of a single policy (in marked contrast to the situation under 
an occurrence policy). 
B. Transforming Risk into Uncertainty 
At the same time that these developments transformed uncertainty 
into risk, other developments pushed in the opposite direction. In the 
personal lines liability insurance context, which mostly means automo­
bile liability insurance, the two most important developments were 
the "arms race" in risk segmentation and the politics of automobile 
insurance pricing. The commercial lines context is more complicated 
because commercial liability risks evolve with the underlying econ­
omy. One important and easy-to-explain commercial lines develop­
ment concerns corporations' increased willingness to retain risk, with 
the result that commercial liability insurance increasingly involves the 
right tail risk, precisely the opposite of personal automobile liability 
insurance. The sections that follow explain each of these. 
1. The Arn1s Race in Automobile Risk Segmentation and 
Distribution 
Of all of the forms of insurance investigated by Ericson and Doyle, 
personal automobile liability insurance is most like life insurance, at 
least in terms of the dynamics of uncertainty and risk. Like mortality, 
automobile liability risk is well understood in the aggregate. And, be­
cause of the quant revolution in claims evaluation and the increasingly 
binding nature of automobile liability insurance limits, the loss associ-
39. See id. at 388; Bob Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence of Jn.wrcmc:e Policy Conditions in 
Order to Avoid Disproportionate Forfeiture: Claims-Made Formats as a Test Case, 5 CoNN. INs. 
L.J. 505, 508-09 (1998). 
40. See generally Works, supra note 39, at 505. 
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ated with any given automobile liability claim is almost as determina­
ble as the loss associated with any given death claim. So, as with life 
insurance, the competitive action lies in innovations in the slicing and 
dicing of the insured population and in product distribution. (Unlike 
life insurance, competition in the auto insurance industry rarely in­
volves innovations in product development because of strict regula­
tory controls over the automobile insurance policy.)41 A company 
that develops a new way to identify the low risk-segment of an ex­
isting risk category reaps a double benefit: lowering its own average 
claims cost in that segment while increasing the average claims costs 
of its competitors. Similarly, a company that develops a new way to 
distribute its product-through a new affinity relationship or a new 
direct mail or television campaign, for example-simultaneously gets 
new customers and disrupts the business patterns of its competition. 
The result is an evolving set of risk classifications that limits the 
ability of insurers to price on the basis of their own claims history 
(because they did not collect data on the basis of these classifications 
in the past) and an evolving customer mix. As with life insurance, the 
aggregate risk is a predictable, slowly moving mass, but the dynamics 
of the market mean that individual insurers operate at the edge-or 
just beyond the edge-of their knowledge. The quant revolution 
changes the location of that edge, not the competitive pressure to op­
erate just beyond it. 
2. The Politics of Automobile Insurance Pricing 
The politics of automobile insurance pricing inserts an additional 
uncertainty into the automobile liability market that does not exist in 
the life insurance market. With the transition of the Massachusetts 
automobile insurance market to a kind of managed competition,42 
there are no longer any state insurance departments that set rates. 
But all state insurance departments retain some authority over 
changes in rates. Given inflation and the fact that insurance rates are 
set in nominal dollar terms, all insurance companies eventually need 
to raise their automobile insurance rates. In most cases, insurance 
regulators do not object. But sometimes they do object. That is a 
source of uncertainty. 
41. The recent "accident forgiveness" programs represent a partial exception to this rule. 
Strictly speaking. accident forgiveness programs represent a change in pricing. not in product 
design. but the programs are marketed as a feature that is analogous to a change in design. 
42. See, e.g .. Phil Gusman. Mass. Auto Insurers Hail Improved Market Since Reforms, Despite 
Criticism by AG. NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Apr. 19, 2010, at 14. 
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3. Commercial Liability Insurance: A Window on the Underlying 
Economy 
It is difficult to make useful generalizations about a business that is 
as diverse as commercial liability insurance, a field that in its broadest 
definition includes professional liability insurance, many specialized 
forms of liability insurance, and the more commonly understood gen­
eral liability insurance. Liability insurance tends to extend over time 
to match liability itself (with lags and with exceptions), and thus devel­
opments in liability law, both on the books and in action, represent a 
source of uncertainty for liability insurers.43 Almost all changes in the 
economy produce at least some change in the mix of liabilities as­
sumed by liability insurers, and thus the creative destruction of a capi­
talist economy represents another source of uncertainty for liability 
insurers.44 The shift from manufacturing to services, the globalization 
of the supply chain, and the expansion of the high tech and health care 
sectors of the economy, among many other developments, all have 
consequences for liability insurers if only by reducing the predictive 
value of historical information about the frequency and severity of 
claims. 
4. Corporations Retain More Risk 
There is one major cross-cutting development in the commercial 
lines marketplace that is worth singling out: businesses of all kinds are 
retaining greater levels of risk, as represented by the rising deductibles 
and self-insured retentions. Businesses, unlike individuals, have 
learned what may be the most important lesson of risk management 
theory and research: because of the inevitable loading costs of insur­
ance, it makes no sense to buy insurance for losses that are small in 
relation to easily available assets.45 Since at least the 1980s, businesses 
have preferred to buy liability insurance policies with higher deduct­
ibles and higher limits.46 The aggregate result is to remove the most 
predictable liabilities from the liability insurance pool, leaving insurers 
dependent on providing protection against relatively extreme liabili­
ties. Replacing the premium lost when a corporation raises its work­
ers compensation or liability insurance deductible by $1 million 
requires selling a lot of excess insurance, because excess coverage is 
43. Baker, supra note 25, at 133. 
44. See generally JosEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942). 
45. See, e.g., Scorr E. HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RisK MANAGEMENT AND IN­
SURANCE 489, 505 (2d ed. 2004) (explaining reasons for retaining risk). 
46. /d. at 527 (reporting that "medium to large business insurance policies often include rela­
tively large deductibles or self insured retentions"). 
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less expensive than primary insurance on a per-dollar-of-coverage ba­
sis. As a result, commercial liability insurance has become increas­
ingly focused on the right tail of the liability claim distribution, which 
is characterized by larger, less frequent losses, especially for large or­
ganizations. Liability insurers believe that, in the jargon of the busi­
ness press, this is a "fat tail," meaning that commercial liability losses 
do not follow a normal distribution.47 As the quant revolution en­
ables large organizations to transform their liability uncertainties into 
risk, the organizations will retain more of that risk, and they will en­
deavor to shift the remaining uncertainties to their liability insurers. 
C. The Insurance Underwriting Cycle 
As reflected most clearly in Figures 1 and 3, the property casualty 
insurance industry goes through a business cycle that is characterized 
by long periods of relatively stable insurance prices, often slowly de­
clining in real terms, and short periods of rapid price increases. There 
is an extensive literature on this cycle-including a contribution by 
me-and perhaps the one thing upon which there is universal agree­
ment is that no one fully understands what drives the cycle.4x Not 
surprisingly, the cycle is a major preoccupation in the industry. Indus­
try trade publications regularly report on what industry leaders and 
analysts think about where the industry is in the cycle, and predictions 
of this sort can have very significant strategic implications for 
companies. 49 
During a "hard market," prices significantly exceed costs and insur­
ers can implement new restrictions on coverage and underwriting. 
During a "soft market," prices gradually decline in real terms and in­
surers gradually abandon coverage and underwriting restrictions. By 
the end of the soft market, almost all insurers are almost certainly 
selling insurance below cost, retaining market share in the hope of 
making money once the market turns hard. Warren Buffet, whose 
most significant holdings are property casualty insurance companies, 
47. See Roger Gay, Pricing Risk When Distributions Are Fat Tailed, 4l A J. APPLIED 
PRoBABILITY 157, 157-58 (2004) (reporting that generally insurance claims arc fat tailed). 
48. See Baker, supra note 22, a t 401-22 (summarizing literature). For recent contributions. 
see Ursina B. Meier, Multi-National Underwriting Cycles in Property-Liability Insurance: Part/­
Some Theory and Empirical Results, 7 J. OF RisK FIN. 64 (2006); Julien Trufin, Hansjorg Al­
brecher & Michel Denuit, Impact of Umlenvriting Cycles on the Solvency of em lnwmmce Com­
pany, 13 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 385 (2009). 
49. See, e.g., David Gambrill, What Happened to the Hard Market?. CANADIAN UNDER· 
WRITER, Oct. 2009, at 78, 78; Barrett Hubbard, The lnevital>ility of Market Cycles. CANADIAN 
UNDERWRITER, Sept. 2007, at 34. 35; AI Slavin, Wlwt's Next?: Surplus Lines Writers Look to 
New Products and Specialized Undenvriting to Extend Business, BEsT's REv . . Apr. 2010, at 28, 
29. 
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has famously advocated paying underwriters not to write insurance 
during severe soft markets, because the company will almost certainly 
lose money on the book of insurance sold at that time. 5° The problem 
is, of course, that no one really knows when the cycle reaches the 
point at which liability insurance costs exceed prices-because the 
costs will not be known for sure until the future-and no one really 
knows the value of keeping market share during the soft market.51 
The underwriting cycle contributes to the uncertainty in liability in­
surance in a variety of ways. The periodic relaxation and restriction of 
underwriting and coverage practices reduce the predictive value of 
each insurance company's claims history, because the mix of risks in­
sured does not remain consistent over time. Keeping market share 
during a soft market involves heading off into the unknown. By defi­
nition, the relaxation of underwriting and coverage restrictions means 
selling insurance against risks that the insurer had not been willing to 
insure in the prior period. Among reinsurers, a continuation of a soft 
market means that the reinsurer needs to be easier for insurers to deal 
with and that means relaxing-and at some point abandoning-de­
tailed reporting requirements at the individual insured and claim 
level. 52 The result is that reinsurers do not have continuous individual 
and claim level data of the sort that would allow them to control for 
the changing mix of business among the insurance companies that 
they reinsure. When the hard market arrives, insurance companies 
raise prices and jettison some of their worst risks, almost certainly 
writing profitable business-but just how profitable remains uncer­
tain, as does the amount of time before enough new capital enters the 
insurance market for the underwriting cycle to turn once again.53 In 
that sense, we can regard the liability insurance underwriting cycle as 
both a cause and a consequence of liability insurers' efforts to push 
the insurability frontier. 
50. Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman, Bd. of Dirs. of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Share­
holders 6-8 (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.cornlletters/2004ltr.pdf. 
51. See Matthew Dolan, Repeating tire Sins of Market Cycles, INSKHITS, Oct. 2003, at 1 (on file 
with author) (article by the president of a liability insurance company reporting "our industry 
realizes the 'right priced' environment only momentarily during the shirt from the hard to the 
soft market" and arguing "the cyclicality of this business will be perpetuated, and capacity will 
engage in wild and irrational movements over the price/quality line. unless carriers" adopt a 
variety of measures that are unlikely to be adopted given competitive pressures). 
52. Author's confidential, personal communication with reinsurance underwriters as part of 
the field research reported in ToM BAKER & SEAN J. GRJFFITII, ENsURJNO CoRPORATE Mis­
coNDucT: How LtABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SIIAREHOLDER LITIGATION (2010). 
53. See generally Baker, supra note 22, at 393: Dolan, supra note 51, at 1: Fitzpatrick, supra 
note 12, at 255. 
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IV. CoNCLUSION 
These competitive consequences of the liability insurance under­
writing cycle resonate well with the dynamic of Ericson and Doyle's 
Uncertain Business.54 Even as liability insurers develop technologies 
that would better predict the losses of a stable risk pool, competition 
reshapes companies' risk pools, so that they operate just beyond the 
edge of their knowledge. This dynamic helps explain how the liability 
insurance field can feel out of control even to expert participants. 
"Fear is the key," in the words of insurance industry leader Sean Fitz­
patrick. 55 Those feelings put expert passion behind the popular be­
liefs that have fueled the restrictive tort reform movement. Taking the 
long view, liability and liability insurance premiums have grown at 
about the same rate as the U.S. economy. But few people live their 
lives consistently taking this long view, and the long view may not 
even be adaptive in the competitive arena. 
54. See generally ERICSON & DoYLE, supra note 1. 
55. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 12, at 255-56 (quoting title of Alistair MacLean's novel, FEAR 
Is THE KEY). 
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